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Adaptive Logics as a Necessary Tool
for Relative Rationality.
Including a Section on Logical Pluralism
Diderik Batens
1 Aim of this Paper
In most papers on adaptive logics, for example [9, 12], and in the forthcoming book
[14], I try to remain philosophically neutral on whatever is not strictly relevant for
adaptive logics. People with different political viewpoints may play the violin, or
handle a hammer. Similarly, people with different philosophical viewpoints may
apply the same adaptive logics, which may be sensibly classified as reasoning in-
struments. Tying those logics to my specific philosophical convictions would scare
away some readers.
Of course, I have philosophical convictions. Especially those in the realm of
epistemology motivated the origin and especially the development of the adaptive
logic program. To make this link explicit seems useful. Adaptive logics clarify the
notion of defeasible reasoning and highlight its importance. By doing so, they evoke
a number of epistemological questions and rule out certain epistemological answers
to these questions. The questions are far from specific for my epistemological views,
but present interesting problems for any epistemological view.
So the potential interest of the present paper is double. Adaptive logics were
developed in view of a philosophical need, which is to make a certain epistemolog-
ical position meaningful and precise. These logics represent precise formulations
of methods and actually of a multiplicity of alternative methods—plurality is easy
from an adaptive perspective. The resulting problem for any epistemological stand
is: In which way may such methods be integrated?
I shall begin by a, necessarily rough, sketch of my epistemological stand. This
is meant as a point of reference and as an example of a stand in which defeasible
reasoning, especially as approached by adaptive logics, finds its natural place.
Diderik Batens
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Universiteit Gent, Belgium, e-mail:
Diderik.Batens@UGent.be
1
2 Diderik Batens
After a quick rehearsal of adaptive logics, formal problem-solving processes are
introduced. In these, adaptive logics have their natural place and are able to show
their strength. One or more adaptive logics are here combined with a deductive logic
as well as with an erotetic logic.
In the next four sections, some typical features will be outlined. I chose those that
are presumably most controversial and at the same time most difficult to incorpo-
rate within a formal framework. (i) Contextual meaning of logical terms is handled
within a formal framework rather than within a linguistic one. The discussion con-
cerns the way in which formal properties of the premises determine the meaning
of occurrences of logical terms. (ii) The section on the meaning of logical symbols
concerns the distinction that some want to draw between deductive and defeasible
reasoning forms and the effects of this distinction on the meaning of logical terms.
(iii) The next topic is the contextual meaning of non-logical terms. (iv) The tradi-
tional notion of a theory is confronted with an alternative in the section on complex
theories. The central issue is that traditional theories may fail to be efficient means
to embody the best available human knowledge. While complex theories have the
disadvantages of their complexity, including their computational complexity, they
are able to describe complex domains that are beyond the reach of traditional theo-
ries. (v) The section on logical pluralism is mainly meant to clarify a form of logical
pluralism that does not coincide with most positions defended and attacked in the
literature.
2 Epistemological Stand
This very compressed sketch will consist of a set of theses, each followed by one
or more arguments. An extensive description of my epistemological stand is unfor-
tunately only available in [4] (and in its Greek translation). Some aspects are also
discussed in [1, 2, 3, 5, 20].
The first thesis reads: All knowledge is ultimately defeasible. Note that it says
that all knowledge is defeasible, not that all reasoning is defeasible. Still, even non-
defeasible reasoning starts always from defeasible premises, whence its conclusions
are also defeasible. As we shall see, not all knowledge is defeasible in the same sense
or in the same way.
Many will agree that most empirical knowledge is defeasible. Inductive gener-
alizations clearly are, and so are predictions. Most results of abductive reasoning,
which includes explanations, are also defeasible. The same holds for knowledge of
causal relations, expectancies, results of diagnostic reasoning, and so on. While all
this clearly holds for knowledge about the physical world, knowledge about other
humans is no exception. Statements made by trustworthy human beings need to be
interpreted, for example by means of Gricean maxims, which introduce additional
defeasibility—I write “additional” because the statements already rely on defeasible
knowledge of the person who utters the statement.
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Let us turn to experience. That experience is never uninterpreted seems generally
accepted today. I do not know any serious philosopher who identifies the set of
experiential data with Mach’s Empfindungen. Especially the philosophy of science
of the second half of the twentieth century clarified this matter. Many reject the
consequences attached to the insights of that period, especially the different forms
of incommensurability. Yet nobody adduced any good arguments for questioning
the insights themselves, which concern theory-ladenness. So even when we may
have no reasons to mistrust our eyes or other senses, we may be interpreting what
we see, etc., in a mistaken framework. So much more important than occasional
optical or other illusions is the fact that every experience is interpreted and that this
interpretation may be very mistaken, as the history of the sciences readily reveals.
The defeasible character of experience is enhanced by the fact that most so-called
experience is the result of abduction. We think to see that it has rained because we
think to see that the grass is wet, and we think to see that it has snowed because
we think to see that our environment is covered with white stuff. We think to see
a magpie because what we ‘see’ is compatible with what we know about magpies
and not with what we know about any other species of birds. Such abductions occur
usually in an unconscious way. Note that we are on a slippery slope here. There is a
smooth transition from unconscious abduction to theory-laden observation.
Some will argue that we have means to obtain a higher certainty on our observa-
tions: repetition, instruments, experience, and so on—I return to these soon. How-
ever, the very fact that observations may be corrected and that means to obtain more
reliable observations have been devised highlights the defeasibility of experience.
Methodological knowledge (norms and values in general) have long been claimed
to be a priori. Today, informed people have changed their mind basically because
history teaches us that methods are historically contingent and hence clearly defea-
sible. In trying to gather knowledge about the world, we learn how to learn. As Dud-
ley Shapere candidly puts it: “what better basis could we have than what we have
learned, including what we have learned about how to learn” [23, p. 52]. Shapere
couples this with the idea that science is content-guided. He opposes this idea to the
views of the Vienna Circle—its members soon turned to logic1—as well as to the
views of the ‘post-classical’ philosophers of science (Hanson, Kuhn, Toulmin, and
Feyerabend)—these fell into extreme relativism.
Finally, I come to the most touchy and controversial point, logical and mathe-
matical knowledge, even if I do not understand that any sane person could hold such
knowledge to be non-defeasible. The point is not whether, for example, 0′+0′ = 0′′
is a theorem of Peano Arithmetic. The point is whether Peano Arithmetic is com-
plete, non-trivial, suitable (in the sense in which Euclidian Geometry is not suitable
to describe our universe), and so on. The point is also whether we have the right
view on what it means to be a theorem of Peano Arithmetic. We know from Go¨del’s
First Incompleteness Theorem that Peano Arithmetic is incomplete if it is consis-
tent. Whether it is non-trivial we do not know. Most mathematicians think it is, but
1 This paper relies on a conception of logic, and even of formal logic, which is different from the
Vienna Circle’s conception and leaves ample room for content-guidance—see [11] for an elabora-
tion.
4 Diderik Batens
Graham Priest has argued in [21] that it is not, at least not if it is extended with some
obviously correct proof means that do not undermine its semi-recursive character.
Moreover, we know from Go¨del’s Second Incompleteness Theorem that, if Peano
Arithmetic is non-trivial, it is impossible to show so by means that can be repre-
sented within Peano Arithmetic.2 Note that, if Peano Arithmetic is trivial, the state-
ment that 0′+ 0′ = 0′′ is one of its theorems obtains a rather unexpected meaning.
If Priest is right, the whole realm of mathematics has to be rethought, presumably
starting from an inconsistent set-theory and working our way down to mathematical
theories that we apply in everyday life.
We have known more revolutions in the history of mathematics. Many theories
originated in a definite period. Their early history was often messy and full of non-
sense. The early history of algebra is a ready example. Many years were required
before one arrived at symbolic algebra and only then was sense made of isolated
negative terms—see for example [17, 18]. Some theories, like Newton’s infinitesi-
mal calculus or Cantor’s set theory or Frege’s set theory were later found to be mis-
taken, even nonsensical if taken literally. There are the other limitative theorems, all
discovered less than a century ago. All this drastically changed the conception of
mathematical theories.
So mathematical knowledge is at least defeasible in the sense that one’s best
insights at some point in time may be later superseded by insights that derive from
further study, or from improved conceptual insights, or presumably also from the
development of empirical sciences. I shall argue in Section 8 that the same holds for
logic.
The second thesis is a consequence of the preceding one: No foundation is avail-
able in any domain. This means that the only way to arrive at justified convictions
is to improve our knowledge by relying on our present knowledge. Of course, we
may and should learn from the history of knowledge, especially in methodological
respects. But even historiography is the result of our present insights. Obviously, we
should collect new data. Still, which data have to be collected and the importance
and significance that will be attached to them will depend on present lights. This is
what I call relative rationality (and relative justification).
Two other theses are directly connected to the previous one, but space does not
permit to explain the connection. The first thesis: All meaning is contextual. The (in-
tensional) meaning of words does not reside in some Platonic heaven, but in people’s
heads. As such, they depend on one’s view on the domain. Studying any outdated
theory from the history of the sciences is convincing in this respect. The second
thesis: Actual knowledge systems are neither holistic nor hierarchical. They consist
of set of (larger or smaller, more or less vague) clusters of knowledge (about the
world, methods, language, . . . ). These clusters are invoked to solve specific prob-
lems. They may be mutually inconsistent. Some of the clusters are related. (i) Some
clusters are extended with consequences of others if the need presents itself—as
when the knowledge related to handling everyday objects is extended with some
physics or geometry to solve a specific problem. (ii) Some of the clusters are as-
2 Even this Theorem is defeasible. It is proved by means that are only reliable if Peano Arithmetic
is non-trivial.
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sociated with others—a set of methodological do’s and don’ts may be related to a
scientific discipline.
According to this viewpoint, the central epistemological tasks are the following.
First of all, one has to solve problems at all ‘levels’, including the conceptual orga-
nization of scientific theories and their unification. Such tasks are subordinate to the
central problems that have to be solved. Next, one often has to analyse the context
(problem-solving situation) in order to reach a solution. A third and central task is
to reduce the role of ‘pragmatic factors’, factors that depend on properties of the
knowing person or group rather than on the domain studied. Note that this reduction
takes always place on the basis of available knowledge; it is not a matter of reaching
more ‘objectivity’. Another central task is furthering intellectual combat. Intellec-
tual fight prevailed in all pivotal periods of the history of the sciences. It is the only
means to discover the weak spots in our convictions and to strengthen them.
Subsequent sections are intended as an answer to the question whether the out-
lined epistemological stand makes sense from a logical point of view and whether it
can be backed up by logical means.
3 Adaptive Logics: A Quick Rehearsal
An adaptive logic is a formal logic that ‘adapts itself to the premises’ and charac-
terizes a defeasible reasoning form. The ultimate aim of the adaptive logic program
is to characterize all defeasible reasoning forms by an adaptive logic in standard
format.
In standard format, an adaptive logic is defined by a triple: (i) a lower limit logic
LLL, roughly a deductive Tarski logic that is compact and for which there is a
positive test,3 (ii) a set of abnormalities Ω , which is characterized by a (possibly
restricted) logical form,4 and (iii) an adaptive strategy: Reliability or Minimal Ab-
normality.5
The standard format provides the adaptive logic with dynamic proofs. Typical
for the annotated proofs is that each line has a possibly empty condition, which
is a finite set of abnormalities. The lower limit logic and the set of abnormalities
determine the inferential rules (in terms of LLL-consequence), the set of abnormal-
ities and the strategy determine the Marking definition. This definition proceeds in
terms of the formulas that occur at the stage of the proof. Marked lines are con-
sidered OUT—their formula is not derived at the stage—while unmarked lines are
3 There is a positive test for a logic L iff {〈Γ ,A〉 | Γ `L A; A is a formula; Γ is a recursive set
of formulas} is a semi-recursive set. A more general description is that LLL is any logic that has
static proofs, but space prevents me from clarifying this here.
4 For example, a formula of the form ∃(A∧¬A) or a formula of the form ∃A∧∃¬A, in which
∃A denotes the existential closure of A. A possible restriction is that A is a primitive (or atomic)
formula, or that A is a disjunction of primitive formulas and negations of primitive formulas.
5 These two strategies handle derivable disjunctions of abnormalities in different ways and have a
different effect on the proofs and on the selection semantics.
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considered IN. As the proof proceeds from one stage to the next, a marked line
may become unmarked and vice versa. Note that the marks are a means to control
the defeasible character of the logic: a formula is derivable or underivable from the
premises in view of the insights in the premises that is offered by the stage of the
proof. A definition settles which formulas are finally derivable from the premises.
As (full-blown) defeasible logics have no positive test for final derivability, a finite
proof in itself will often not enable one to decide that a formula is finally derivable
from the premises; one needs a metatheoretic reasoning about possible extensions
of the proof.
The standard format also provides adaptive logics with a semantics, viz. a selec-
tion semantics. The lower limit logic assigns a set S of models to the premise set; the
set of abnormalities and strategy select a subset of S as the set of adaptive models of
the premises.
Finally, the standard format also provides most of the metatheory: Soundness and
Completeness of the proof theory with respect to the semantics, and a host of further
metatheoretic properties.
Incidentally, the logic obtained by extending LLL with an axiom that connects
abnormalities to triviality (or by weeding out models that verify an abnormality) is
called the upper limit logic ULL. A remarkable property of adaptive logics is that
CnAL(Γ ) = CnULL(Γ ) whenever Γ is normal (does not require any abnormalities
to be true), whereas CnLLL(Γ ) ⊆ CnAL(Γ ) ⊂ CnULL(Γ ) = W (with W the set of
all formulas) whenever Γ is abnormal.
Adaptive logics are called corrective iff they handle premise sets that have no
models in the ‘standard logic’; otherwise they are called ampliative. Where CL
(classical logic) is taken to be the standard, adaptive logics handling inconsistencies
are corrective, while adaptive logics for inductive generalization are ampliative. For
a more detailed description of the distinction, I refer for example to [9, 12, 14].
4 Formal Problem-Solving Processes
Logics are not applied in isolation. This holds especially when adaptive logics are
involved. Such logics are precise characterizations of methods and are at least com-
bined with a deductive logic, usually their own lower limit logic. Obviously, several
adaptive logics may be combined. This is the case, for example, when we look for
an explanation of a fact in terms of present knowledge, but try to extend our knowl-
edge with new inductive generalizations6 in case our present knowledge does not
provide an explanation.
Reasoning is a goal-directed and problem-oriented process. So we need to be
able to express problems and the process should be sensible in view of the solution
of the problem or problems. Moreover, we need to be able to ascertain whether a
6 Many logicians appear to be mesmerized by the grue paradox. However, this concerns the choice
of a language (or of a set of primitive predicates), which has obviously to be justified by non-logical
means: entrenchment, etc.
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problem is well-formed in view of the available declarative knowledge, we need to
be able to split up problems, and to derive problems from given problems in view
of declarative knowledge. More often than not, the solution of a problem requires
empirical import. This is obviously not provided by any logic, but the adaptive logic
should trigger the empirical import; it should instruct one whether new empirical
data may be relevant or not.
The required combination is realized by means of formal problem-solving pro-
cesses, fpsps for short. These were first proposed in [8]. In [11] it was shown that
fpsps leave ample room for, and actually install, content-guidance; it was also shown
that building in observational or experimental means requires an ‘oracle’ that is dif-
ferent from the one introduced by Hintikka in [19]. So let me describe the elements
of a fpsp backbone.
An fpsp is a sequence of lines that results from a procedure. This is a set of
instructions that consist of a rule with a permission or obligation attached to it; the
permission or obligation should be defined in terms of the lines that already occur
in the fpsp. A fpsp contains two kinds of lines.
Declarative lines are quadruples: a line number, a prospective expression of the
form [B1, . . . ,Bn]A, a justification, and an adaptive condition. The prospective ex-
pression states that A can be obtained from the premises iff the members of the
prospective condition, [B1, . . . ,Bn] (n≥ 0), can be obtained from them. The prospec-
tive dynamics is basically a way to push part of the proof heuristics into the proof
(see [16]); the members of the prospective condition function as targets in view of
which premises are introduced and analysed. Moreover, the prospective dynamics
leads to criteria for final derivability in adaptive logics (see [10, 26]). The adap-
tive conditions are those of the involved adaptive logics; they are essential for the
marking and hence for the control of the involved defeasible reasoning forms—see
Sect. 3.
Problem lines are couples: a problem, which is phrased as a set of yes-no ques-
tions {?{A1,¬A1}, . . . ,?{An,¬An}} and a justification. Problems are handled in
terms of Andrzej Wis´niewski’s erotetic logic (see [30, 31, 29, 28]), which does not
presuppose a specific deductive logic but is defined in a general way. The erotetic
logic handles the evocation of questions by declarative premises and the implication
of questions by other questions in view of declarative premises. As fpsps (by present
lights) start from a main problem and a set of premises, only question implication
plays a role. Note that deriving a sub-problem from a problem is a logical matter,
whereas deriving an ‘auxiliary’ problem requires declarative knowledge.
Apart from Wis´niewski’s erotetic logic, which handles questions, there are spe-
cific rules to handle problems. Thus, once an answer to ?{Ai,¬Ai} (1 ≤ i ≤ n) is
obtained—once Ai or ¬Ai is derived on an empty prospective condition—the prob-
lem {?{A1,¬A1}, . . . ,?{An,¬An}} − {?{Ai,¬Ai}} is derivable from the problem
{?{A1,¬A1}, . . . ,?{An,¬An}}. As soon as the former is derived, the latter becomes
redundant.
The main problem is essential for the goal-directed character of fpsps. A prospec-
tive proof normally starts with a (redundant) goal statement of the form [A]A, which
is meant to introduce A as a target. In an fpsp, goal statements are derived from
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non-redundant problems. This means that [A]A can only be introduced if ?{A,¬A}
is a member of a non-redundant problem. Once targets are present, the prospective
dynamics warrants the goal-directed character of the fpsp; a new line can only be
added if its prospective expression potentially brings us closer to deriving a target.
Whether it actually brings us closer to deriving a target depends on the premises and
cannot in general be settled beforehand, given that we are not logically omniscient.
Finally, new problems are only introduced if derived declarative statements warrant
that their solution is useful for solving given problems in view of the declarative
premises.
Note that fpsps guides research. The introduction of a goal statement [A]A will,
after a number of steps, lead to the presence of expressions of the form [B1, . . . ,Bn]A.
This suggests observations, experiments, conceptual analysis, or bringing in other
information, and all of these will lead to new premises. New premises will be re-
quired if ?{A,¬A} is a member of a problem and the prospective conditions of A
and ¬A cannot be derived from the premises. Even if the question can be answered
by deductive means, a new premise may be more easily obtainable by observation
than by deduction.
I only presented an outline of the backbone of fpsps. Still, having referred the
reader to other papers, I should stress that lots of work still has to be carried out.
Thus the incorporation of some adaptive logics in fpsps requires that the relevant
heuristics is elaborated. All this, however, is pretty standard or at least does not
require much ingenuity.
5 Contextual Meaning
The first point I shall make is that adaptive logics introduce contextual meanings.
To see this, consider a simple propositional example of a proof for the logic CLuNr.
Its lower limit logic (generic name: LLL) is CLuN, which is full positive proposi-
tional logic together with excluded middle. The set of propositional abnormalities
comprises the formulas of the form A∧¬A—the predicative abnormalities are the
existential closure of those formulas, in which A is then possibly open. The strategy
is Reliability—see below.
The (generic) rules of inference are the same for all (non-combined) adaptive
logics. Let
A ∆
abbreviate that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆ , which is a set of abnor-
malities (so a subset of Ω ). There are three generic rules. In RC,
∨ˇ
Θ denotes the
classical disjunction of the members of Θ ⊂ Ω and the symbol ∨ˇ is the classical
disjunction.7
7 I skip some related complications. They are not relevant to the point I am trying to make here.
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Prem If A ∈ Γ : . . . . . .
A /0
RU If A1, . . . ,An `LLL B: A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1∪ . . .∪∆n
RC If A1, . . . ,An `LLL B ∨ˇ ∨ˇΘ : A1 ∆1
. . . . . .
An ∆n
B ∆1∪ . . .∪∆n∪Θ
Let the premise set be {(¬p∧¬q)∧ t, p∨ r,q∨ s, p∨q, t ⊃ p}. Here is the proof
up to stage 8:8
1 (¬p∧¬q)∧ t PREM /0
2 p∨ r PREM /0
3 q∨ s PREM /0
4 p∨q PREM /0
5 t ⊃ p PREM /0
6 r 1, 2; RC {p∧¬p} √
7 s 1, 3; RC {q∧¬q} √
8 (p∧¬p)∨ (q∧¬q) 1, 4; RU /0
Lines 6 and 7 are marked at this stage of the proof. Where Reliability is the strat-
egy, a line is marked at a stage iff its condition contains a disjunct of a minimal
disjunction of abnormalities. At stage 8 of the proof, the only minimal disjunction
of abnormalities is the formula of line 8. Let us now consider stage 9 of the proof—I
rewrite the sequence of lines from line 6 on.
6 r 1, 2; RC {p∧¬p} √
7 s 1, 3; RC {q∧¬q}
8 (p∧¬p)∨ (q∧¬q) 1, 4; RU /0
9 p∧¬p 1, 5; RU /0
Line 6 is still marked, but line 7 is unmarked. Indeed, the only minimal disjunction
of abnormalities at stage 9 is the formula of line 9, viz. p∧¬p.9
In all subsequent stages of the proof—in more traditional terms: in all extensions
of this proof—line 6 is marked and that line 7 unmarked. In other words, the proof
at stage 9 is stable with respect to lines 6 and 7 (and actually with respect to lines
1–7). So s is finally derivable from Γ , whereas r is not.10
8 A stage is a sequence of lines and a proof is a chain of stages.
9 The Minimal Abnormality strategy leads, for some premise sets, to a richer consequence set than
the Reliability strategy. For this proof, however, both strategies lead to the same marks.
10 The definition of final derivability is slightly more sophisticated, but this is what it comes to for
the present propositional example.
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The above proof nicely illustrates the contextual meaning of negation. The nega-
tion in ¬p is clearly the paraconsistent CLuN-negation because both p and ¬p are
CLuNr-derivable from the premises. The negation in ¬q has the force of a CL-
negation. Precisely this is why s is a consequence of the premises: s follows from
¬q and q∨ s because the premises do not require that q∧¬q is a disjunct of a true
and minimal disjunction of abnormalities.11
To understand what is going on, let us have a look at the preferred application
context of inconsistency-adaptive logics. Consider a theory T , that is intended as
consistent and has CL as its underlying logic, but turns out to be inconsistent. Often,
one will try to find a consistent replacement T ′, and one will try to obtain it by
reasoning from T . One typically will want a T ′ that is as rich as T , except that T ′
should be consistent. While CL is obviously useless for this purpose (it identifies
T with the trivial theory), (static) paraconsistent logics are too weak; many ‘good’
consequences of T will not be derivable by the paraconsistent logic because it is
much weaker than CL.
Inconsistency-adaptive logics are obviously not intended to remove the inconsis-
tencies. This should be done on the basis of non-logical arguments: new empirical
data or new results of conceptual analysis. Incidentally, it is not difficult to devise
adaptive logics that remove inconsistencies. However, some such logics lead to ar-
bitrary results (removing, for example, p in favour of ¬p) and some leave one with
too poor a theory (when it removes both ‘halves’ of every inconsistency).
In preparation of removing the inconsistencies by non-logical means, we need
to obtain a maximally consistent interpretation of T , from which the inconsisten-
cies may then be removed. Inconsistency-adaptive logics should provide us with
such an interpretation. The example proof illustrates the way in which they do so.
Inconsistency-adaptive logics, like CLuNr, interpret premise sets as consistently as
possible.12 In other words, inconsistencies are considered as false, except when the
premises prevent this; for Reliability this comes to: except when the inconsistency
is a disjunct of a minimal disjunction of abnormalities that is derivable from the
premises by the lower limit logic. Precisely because inconsistency-adaptive logics
interpret premise sets as consistently as possible, they assign a contextual meaning
to negation. It is worth noting that the meaning that is assigned to a negation depends
on the content of the premise set.
Incidentally, why do we need a maximal consistent interpretation of the theory?
The theory T was intended as closed under CL: every CL-consequence of theorems
of T is itself a theorem of T . This causes T to be trivial. We cannot look for a
consistent replacement of T itself, but we can look for a consistent replacement of
the non-trivial theory that it closest to the original intention, and this is a maximal
consistent interpretation of T . In it the inconsistencies are localized and all ‘parts’
in which no inconsistency is involved are closed under CL.13
11 If the negation is paraconsistent and A as well as ¬A are true, then A∨B and ¬A are true even if
B is false.
12 This expression is ambiguous and is disambiguated by the strategy.
13 A maximal consistent interpretation can only be defined by a defeasible inference relation and
the adaptive logic program aims at characterizing all such relations.
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There is a variety of inconsistency-adaptive logics. Each of them offers a variety
of maximally consistent interpretations of T . In doing so, each of them assigns, for
every formula of the form ¬A, one of (at least) two meanings to the ¬ in view of
the premise set. These are the meanings of negation as fixed by respectively the
lower limit logic and the upper limit logic. By varying the lower limit logic and
the set of abnormalities—the latter may have effects on the upper limit logic—one
varies the couples of negations that is chosen from. By varying the strategy and
by certain variations of the set of abnormalities,14 one may vary the choices made
between a same couple of negations. A similar (but different) variation is obtained
by combined adaptive logics.15 Incidentally, some combined inconsistency-adaptive
logics assign contextual meanings to negations by choosing from more than two
negations.
Do not complain about the large variety of possibilities. As was mentioned in
Sect. 1, adaptive logics form precise formulations of methods, in the present case
methods for handling inconsistency. The choice between such methods requires a
philosophical justification, which should be contextual in that it should depend on
the properties of the specific situation. More variation is spelled out in [14, Chap. 7].
There is, however, a very different multiplicity of adaptive logics for handling
inconsistency. An inconsistency, viz. that some A is true together with ¬A, may be
seen as a negation glut. That A as well as ¬A are false may be seen as a negation
gap. In a similar way, all logical terms (including the quantifiers and identity) may
be said to display gluts or gaps (or both). One way to define the gluts and gaps is
with respect to the CL-truth conditions. For example, there is an implication glut
if A ⊃ B is true while A is true and B is false, and there is an implication gap if
A ⊃ B is false while A is false or B is true. The interesting point is that many in-
consistent theories have models in which no negation gluts but other gluts or gaps
occur. Whenever this is the case, the adaptive approach (which ‘minimizes’ abnor-
malities) leads to ‘interpretations’ of the inconsistent theory that are as normal as
possible. This was explained already in [6] and the matter is studied at some length
in [14, Chap. 8]. There I also consider the ambiguity of non-logical terms16 as well
as its combination with kinds of gluts and gaps for logical terms. The combination
of ambiguity with all kinds of gluts and gaps leads to zero logic, by which nothing is
derivable from any premise set, not even the premises themselves. All the (Tarski)
logics and combinations of them lead to adaptive logics that define a maximally
normal interpretation of the premises. The adaptive logic that has zero logic as its
lower limit may not be very interesting in itself, but it is an excellent instrument for
14 Given a lower limit logic, there are often several sets of abnormalities that lead to the same upper
limit logic.
15 Several combined adaptive logics have been described. The simplest combination, which obvi-
ously works only under certain conditions, is where a consequence set of Γ is defined as the union
of the consequence sets different simple adaptive logics assign to Γ .
16 Present ambiguity-adaptive logics do not assign any specific meanings to occurrences of non-
logical terms. They merely minimize the number of occurrences of the same term that require a
different meaning.
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surveying which choices (of gluts, gaps and ambiguities) are sufficient to obtain a
minimally abnormal interpretation of the premises.
So each of these adaptive logics offers a minimally abnormal interpretation of
premise sets and introduces contextual meanings for all the logical terms for which
they tolerate gluts or gaps. The same holds for ampliative adaptive logics—the mat-
ter is just a trifle more complicated.
6 Meaning of Logical Symbols
According to the official doctrine, a logic determines the meaning of its logical
terms. By “logic” is meant a deductive logic here. What comes of this if adaptive
logics are applied? Three positions seem sensible: the two-logic view, the dialetheist
view, and the direct view.
According to the two-logic view, the meaning of logical terms is defined by the
lower limit logic and the upper limit logic, which may be seen as deductive logics.
The adaptive logic picks the right choice for each occurrence of the logical term. It
picks the meaning from the upper limit logic whenever this is possible—a matter
disambiguated and determined by the strategy.
If the adaptive logic AL is corrective, it offers a minimally abnormal inter-
pretation of a theory or premise set. If the theory is normal, AL offers a normal
interpretation—say the CL-interpretation. If the theory is abnormal, AL offers an
interpretation according to which some logical terms have a meaning that is weaker
than the CL-meaning. In the preferred application context, the result will eventually
be replaced, on non-logical grounds, by a normal theory. So the contextual mean-
ings are provisional; they apply in a transitory period in which problems have still
to be solved in order to reach the ‘finished’ and normal theory.
It is worth noting that even the transitory stage17 can be made fully transparent
from a logical point of view. Suppose for example that we are dealing with a simple
adaptive logic which has CL as its upper limit and some weaker logic LLL as its
lower limit. Let the standard logical symbols be those of LLL. It is obviously possi-
ble to enrich the language of LLL with a set of logical symbols that have the same
meanings as the symbols of CL—the Ghent standard is to use ‘checked’ symbols
for these: ¬ˇ, ∧ˇ, . . . , ∃ˇ, and =ˇ. From the premises of the example proof in Sect. 5,
¬ˇq is finally derivable whereas ¬ˇp is not.18 Note that only the standard symbols
occur in the premises and that the adaptive logic determines which negations may
be replaced by the CL-negation.
As announced in Sect. 5, the matter is slightly more complicated for ampliative
adaptive logics (such as adaptive logics for inductive generalization, for abduction,
and so on). These adaptive logics offer a richer consequence set than CL (which I
17 See the previous paragraph: the stage at which the adaptive theory is not yet replaced by a novel
normal theory.
18 Except for negation, all logical symbols of CLuN have the same meaning as the classical logical
symbols.
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here consider as the standard of deduction for merely pragmatic reasons). To take a
concrete example, consider inductive generalization and let the set of abnormalities
be ∃A∧∃¬A in which ∃A is the existential closure of A.19 The upper limit logic is
the so-called uniform classical logic (it has ∃A⊃∀A as a theorem and, in its models,
the assignment value of every unary predicate is either the empty set or the whole
domain; and similarly for other predicates). A typical application of the conditional
rule, RC, is that from Pa on the empty condition follows ∀xPx on the condition
∃xPx∧∃x¬Px. Let us compare the meaning of the universal quantifier in the up-
per limit logic with its meaning in the lower limit logic CL. The former is only
stronger than the latter in that less information is required for a universally quanti-
fied formula to hold true (a single instance and even the corresponding existentially
quantified formula is sufficient). The upper limit meaning is typically invoked by
the conditional rule, RC, which introduces a new condition in view of its defeasi-
ble character. Once the universally quantified formula is obtained, other formulas
may be derived from it by the unconditional rule, RU, (carrying over the condition).
However, the upper limit meaning of the universal quantifier is not different from
its lower limit meaning in this respect, viz. with respect to the formulas that are
derivable from a universally quantified formula. In other words, once the adaptively
derivable generalizations have been added to the theory, one may ‘reaxiomatize’ the
theory and the result may be seen as a CL-theory.20
So far for the two-logic view. The dialetheist view is radically different from
it, but it is more restricted because it only concerns negation. For a dialetheist like
Graham Priest, there is a ‘true logic’, viz. the paraconsistent LP.21 An adaptive logic
that has LP as its lower limit logic is ampliative for the dialetheist (because LP is the
standard of deduction). Applications of RC are justified by the so-called consistency
presumption: that most inconsistencies are false and hence that they may be taken
to be false unless it is found that the premises require the opposite. So the true
logic alone determines the meaning of the logical terms (in a sense this is a hyper-
classical position). The consistency presumption offers reasons to accept additional
consequences. These, however, do not follow by logic but by logic together with the
consistency presumption. Put differently, the consequence set is changed, but the
meaning of negation is not.
I do not know what a dialetheist would make of the meaning of logical terms in
other, for example ampliative, adaptive logics. I guess that the answer would be that
deductive logic determines the meaning of the logical symbols whereas method-
ological steps do not affect meanings, even if they allow one to derive certain con-
clusions that do not follow by logic.
19 I simplify here. The actual adaptive logic I have in mind here (see [15, 13]) imposes certain
restrictions on A.
20 I here consider the case in which no new premises are added to the theory. Indeed, if new data
are gathered, these may falsify the adaptively derived generalizations and hence trivialize the so
extended ‘reaxiomatized’ theory.
21 The implication is defined in terms of the paraconsistent negation, viz. by ¬A∨B, whence it is
not detachable. In later versions, Priest added a modal implication to LP, which he later replaced
by a relevant implication.
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A more interesting question to be answered by a dialetheist concerns theories that
were intended to be handled by the ‘true logic’, but turned out trivial. Especially if
a detachable implication is around, a mathematical theory, for example, may turn
out to be trivial. So suppose that the dialetheist’s set theory is found to be trivial. In
order to replace it by a non-trivial improvement, the dialetheist will reason from the
trivial set theory. The only way to do so, as far as I see, is by considering an adaptive
logic that has the ‘true logic’ as its upper limit and that has as lower limit a logic
according to which the set theory is non-trivial. Only this approach will lead to a
maximal non-trivial interpretation of the set theory. If such an approach is followed,
the meaning of the logical symbols cannot be defined by the ‘true logic’ because
this results in triviality.
If the true logic is LP (without a detachable implication) as was Graham Priest’s
view before the first edition of [21], the problem can be neglected because B1 ∧
. . .∧Bm (m ≥ 1) is a LP-consequence of {A1, . . . ,An} iff every Bi (1 ≤ i ≤ m) is a
LP-consequence of a single A j (1≤ j ≤ n). So a theory is only trivial iff, for every
formula A, there is an axiom B of the theory from which A is LP-derivable. The
presence of a relevant implication, however, changes the matter drastically.
Finally, let us turn to the direct view. According to this, the adaptive logic itself
determines the meaning of logical symbols. So meaning is explicitly contextual. Let
me explain in which sense this view is different from the two-logic view.
First a technical matter. Some adaptive logics, for example the logic of induc-
tive generalization LI, have the trivial logic Tr as their upper limit.22 To say that
a logical term receives the meaning assigned to it by Tr is a bit of a nonsense. So
it seems more sensible that LI allows one to derive a universally quantified state-
ment ∀A from one or more instances of it, unless and until a statement falsifying ∀A
(for example, ∃¬A) is derived from the premises.23 This only affects the universal
quantifier and, as long as the line on which the universally quantified formula is de-
rived is unmarked (viz. as long as no formula falsifying ∀A is derived), the change
to the meaning of the universal quantifier reduces to the fact that the formula can be
introduced on the basis of an instance.
The relevant philosophical question, which is much more general, is whether de-
ductive logic can be separated from defeasible logic. Technically this separation is
obviously possible. The question, however, is meant in the epistemological sense.
Is it possible, within a given problem solving context in which reasoning occurs,
to construct theories about the meaning of logical terms in such a way that these
theories are independent from the meanings of the non-logical terms? The standard
format of adaptive logics24 was devised in such a way that this separation is main-
tained. It was not shown, however, that all defeasible reasoning will eventually be
22 Do not confuse Tr with the modal logic Triv. Tr is characterized by Γ `Tr A for all Γ and A. It
either has no models or only one, viz. the trivial model.
23 This is not fully accurate. A disjunction of statements of the form ∃¬A will have the same effect
in view of the marking definition. This is one of the reasons why the LI-consequence set of a
consistent premise set is always consistent.
24 A first attempt to formulate it was made in [7]. The present version is in [12] and especially in
[14, Chap. 4].
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integrated in the present standard format of adaptive logics or in a format that allows
for the separation. In other words, it is possible that our theories about the world fix
the meaning of logical terms in a such way that no separate theory about the logical
terms can be split off. This might especially be the case in ‘provisional’ stages of
those theories, in which lots of theoretical problems are still to be solved by means
of defeasible reasoning forms.25 If such a situation obtains, one may still devise
deductive logics but their application will be restricted if not empty and their use
spurious.
Needless to say, the meaning of the logical symbols is determined by the deriv-
ability relation, not by what is actually derived (at a stage or finally) in a proof from
a premise set. This is not any different from deductive logics. For example, that p
was not derived from p∧ q in a given proof does nor affect the meaning of (this)
conjunction.
7 Complex Theories
Until now, I considered adaptive logics as methods, so as mainly relevant for the
development of theories and for their application. But might such logics not also be
employed as underlying logics of theories? I shall offer a brief argument to show
that this is meaningful and, especially in view of Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems,
offers interesting perspectives.
A theory is often seen as a couple comprising a decidable set of axioms and
a logic, T = 〈Γ ,L〉. The set of theorems of the theory, with which the theory is
sometimes identified, is taken to be CnL(Γ ).
Up to the nineteenth century, the logic of most theories was implicit and only
rarely were the axioms listed. Yet theories were considered as well-defined and ap-
parently also as effectively decidable (although the concept itself was not explicitly
around). In the early twentieth century, it was discovered that CL is only semi-
recursive. So (predicative) theories, even if well-defined, are only semi-recursive
consequence sets of a recursive set of axioms. At the same time, Go¨del’s incom-
pleteness theorems revealed grave restrictions—see Sect. 2. Theories with other un-
derlying logics were proposed. These were either also semi-recursive, for example
when the logic was intuitionistic or relevant, or else they were much more complex,
for example when the underlying logic was second order—the reader will remember
that second-order logic requires infinitary rules.
By an adaptive theory I obviously mean a theory T = 〈Γ ,L〉 in which L is an
adaptive logic. For such theories CnL(Γ ) is not in general semi-recursive—it may
be up to Π 11 -complex—see [25].
The reasons for introducing adaptive theories is that the world may be so complex
that it cannot be captured by semi-recursive theories. Or rather, we know that the
world is so complex in view of Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem. If it is captured
25 Some defeasible reasoning forms only concern application problems. Abduction is a ready ex-
ample.
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by an adaptive theory, this theory does not have certain nice properties of traditional
first-order theories, but no nice theory can capture the domain anyway. Moreover,
adaptive theories have certain relatively nice properties. For one thing, they define
theories (in the sense of sets of theorems) just as second-order logics. Their proofs
at a stage are simple in that they proceed in terms of finitary rules; in this sense
they are much simpler than second-order theories. These proofs explicate actual
reasoning and introduce a kind of control, in terms of the conditions and the Marking
definition, that is absent in actual reasoning. Finite adaptive proofs-at-a-stage are
not more complex than, for example, CL-proofs. Even infinite adaptive proofs are
relatively simple, given that they consist of a denumerable set of lines and that all
applied rules are finitary (every conclusion is drawn from finitely many formulas
preceding it). Heuristic procedures for adaptive proofs are available. Moreover, there
are procedural criteria for final derivability (see [10] and especially [26]), whence
certainty can be gained about at least a number of theorems of the theories. Note
that, where a criterion applies, it establishes final derivability in a finite proof.
These criteria are worth a further comment. Establishing final derivability re-
quires in principle that one offers an argument about all (finite or infinite) exten-
sions of a finite proof. There are clearly more than countably many such extensions.
Establishing final derivability in terms of a procedure reduces the complexity of the
required reasoning. It is sufficient to establish that a finite set of formulas cannot
be derived from the (decidable) premise set. The premise set is always countable
and non-derivability is established in terms of the ‘positive part’ relation, which is
decidable.
Even when no criterion applies, proofs at a stage give us the best estimate of
the theory that can be obtained in view of present insights, which are the insights
provided by the present proofs. This is a basis for drawing a defeasible conclusion.
I have some results that relate to Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem: how
to deal with a possibly inconsistent axiom system for arithmetic? As I shall write up
these results soon, I do not mention them here. Moreover, the reader will be more
interested in the question whether adaptive theories may be complete with respect
such domains as true arithmetic (the formulas verified by standard model). Right
now, Peter Verde´e has ideas on the matter that look extremely promising to me—I
advise the reader to look out for forthcoming results. For now, let me restrict myself
to a promise. If true arithmetic is consistent, it is likely that an adaptive theory
is complete with respect to it and that every formula which one can show to be
verified by the standard model, for example the Go¨del sentence, can be shown to be a
theorem of the adaptive theory. If true arithmetic is inconsistent, the standard model
(and most of model theory) is nonsense. So the classicist looses everything she has.
In that case, it is extremely likely that there is an inconsistency-adaptive theory
which is non-trivial and actually behaves for all natural numbers (the numbers of
the standard block) as true arithmetic was intended to behave.
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8 A Form of Logical Pluralism
In Sect. 2, I claimed that all meaning is contextual. In this section, I offer some
further arguments for that claim. These arguments go along with my epistemological
stand, but may be considered independently of it. Let me admit at once that this
section is somewhat touchy. Some papers opposing logical pluralism dragged me
into the scene, but I felt deeply misunderstood, accused of things I never stated,
associated with positions I consider utterly mistaken. If one is misunderstood, one
may attack the ‘opponent’. One may also feel guilty. After all, if X writes out Y’s
position, X will construct Y’s view on the basis of X’s view. Who is to blame for
misunderstanding? So let me try to be constructive and make another attempt to
state my position. Part of the statement is determined by certain misunderstandings,
but I shall not bother the reader with them.
The aim of logic is to explicate reasoning. What is ‘out there’ is actual reasoning
and it has to be explicated. It is not a matter of fact. It is not a platonic heaven. It is
not a domain that has to be described. So no descriptive theory of actual reasoning
will do. The explicandum contains mistakes and there is a normative dimension.
As our culture likes distinctions, let us make them. Some of the reasoning is
deductive, some is defeasible. Deductive reasoning can be separated into formal
reasoning and informal reasoning.26
Formal deductive reasoning concerns logical terms. Its correctness is judged in
view of the meanings of logical terms. This is the reason why deductive (formal)
logics are supposed to fix the meanings of logical terms.
Among the logical terms that extremely frequently occur in actual reasoning are
causal relations, time and tense, deontic operators, and sundry kinds of other modal-
ities. All these are neglected by CL and actually by most other Tarski logics. More
importantly, there is obviously a manifold of each of these. Just think, for example,
of logical modalities, nomological (or ‘physical’) modalities, practical modalities
(it is physically possible but practically impossible to bring the moon into a dif-
ferent orbit tomorrow), and so on. In order to make their case, monologists should
articulate a single logical system that deals with all logical terms, a matter far from
realized today. Moreover, they should be able to use their logical system to axiom-
atize all required mathematical theories as well as all empirical theories.
Some monologists will argue that there is no objection against axiomatizing a
mathematical theory by means of another logic L, as a merely technical realiza-
tion as it were. The idea is that the theorems of the so obtained theory are then
combined with other, for example empirical, statements in order to forge empirical
theories. Note that this will only do if L is at least as strong as the true logic. In other
words, the true logic should be conservative with respect to every mathematical the-
ory. If it is not, non-theorems of the mathematical theory (and of its language) will
26 Defeasible reasoning can also be separated into formal reasoning and informal reasoning. Adap-
tive logics, for example, characterize formal defeasible reasoning forms. However, I shall not need
this distinction in the sequel.
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be derivable by the true logic and hence will ruin the applicability of the original
mathematical theory.
For the sequel of this section, let us restrict attention to the traditional logical
terms, say those of the predicative language schema. I shall argue that even with
this restriction there are reasons for logical pluralism.
Why should the traditional logical terms be unique? Why should only one nega-
tion, one implication, one universal quantifier, . . . occur in reasoning? Everyday
practice clearly points to the opposite. Some negations are paraconsistent while oth-
ers clearly are not. Some implications are contrapositive or transitive, while others
clearly are not—see also below, where I come to the distinction between formaliza-
tion and logical inference, but daily practice clearly favours a multiplicity of logical
terms. So the burden of proof is on those that argue for uniqueness and, claims apart,
they did not produce any sound arguments.
Once we grant that there is a multiplicity of unambiguous logical terms, why
should all unambiguous logical terms occur in all contexts? Whether “context” is
understood here as linguistic context or as problem-solving situation, the facts plea
in favour of a negative answer to the question. So the burden of the proof is again
with those that favour a positive answer. Again, prejudice apart, they failed to pro-
duce any sound arguments.
Once we grant that not all unambiguous logical terms occur in all contexts, why
should a unique logic L be a suitable explication of the logical terms that occur in all
contexts? Let L be a suitable explication for the logical terms that occur in a context
in which we reason about beers. Why should L also be a suitable explication of the
logical terms that occur in the context in which we reason about L? The burden of
the proof . . .
Let me interrupt this for a moment. Many classical logicians, relevance logicians,
dialetheists, . . . just take it for granted that there is a ‘true logic’ L and that L should
be the logic of the metatheory of L. I tried to stepwise spell out what they take for
granted in order to arrive at this conclusion. I stepwise asked for arguments. All
I got, looking at the literature, is the well-known “it is obvious that” (sometimes
phrased as “it is reasonable to take it that”). But let me go on to the final step on
deductive logic.
As soon as we grant that a logic may differ from the logic of its metatheory,
the following seems justified. There is no ‘true logic’ of which parts are used in a
‘context’. In other words, there is no ‘true logic’ that comprises the logical terms
used in all possible contexts (¬1,¬2, . . . ,⊃1,⊃2, . . . ,∧1,∧2, . . . , . . .) and from which
the right logical terms are chosen according to the context. While the burden of
the proof is still on those who claim there is such a logic, let me add some argu-
ments to show that the burden is heavy. (i) Joining logics may ruin the meaning of
the involved logical terms and, worse, may have tonk-like effects (cause the joined
logic to be identical to the aforementioned trivial logic Tr). (ii) The ‘true logic’ can-
not itself determine the contextual choice of terms. (iii) Two unambiguous logical
terms may be equally suitable explications for the same bit of reasoning. Note that
(ii) and (iii) are the reason why monologists candidly separate the formalization of
natural language arguments from logical inference and, equally candidly, leave the
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formalization part unexplicated. Proceeding thus, they put themselves into a quite
comfortable position. Formalizing your statements by means only known to God,
they then decide what follows from your formalized statements according to their
‘true logic’. In this way, they move the burden of the proof to you. If you drew a con-
clusion they reject, you have to find, in their logical system, a formalization of your
statements from which follows your conclusion. Similarly if you reject a conclusion
they draw.
From here, we move on quickly. Let us first move to informal deductive reason-
ing. This concerns reasoning that is correct in view of the meanings of non-logical
(or referring) terms. To these applies all that was said about logical terms, but there
is more. Referring terms are vague, ambiguous, etc. If in doubt, open a dictionary.
Referring terms are also theory-laden. It does not follow that they are incommensu-
rable (theory-ladenness need not prevent communication).
Finally turning to defeasible reasoning, note that all that was said before (about
logical and referring terms) applies here as well. Even more than for deductive rea-
soning, defeasible reasoning requires an explication. The idea that anything a priori
would be involved is as crazy as outdated—see the quotation from Dudley Shapere.
The first line of argument started from human reasoning. Let me briefly follow
a second line of argument. Many people take it that knowledge about logical terms
should not be obtained by starting from actual reasoning. They hold that there are
other ways for obtaining such knowledge and that these refer to a more objective
basis for logical terms.
For a start, let it be mentioned that logical terms are not hardwired in our brains.
In a sense, classical logic is hardwired in digital computers, but that does not prevent
one from writing programs for implementing other logical terms. While our knowl-
edge about the functioning of human brains is far from perfect, we have reasons
to believe that human brains are very different from digital computers. Our present
knowledge about brains does not reveal any hardwired logical terms and rather sup-
ports the claim that logical terms are neurologically complex entities. Moreover, we
are able to handle a variety of logics (classical, intuitionistic, relevant, . . . ) and noth-
ing suggests that one of these is the basis from which the other logical terms can be
implemented in our brains.
It is sometimes claimed that truth-preservation provides access to the true mean-
ings of logical terms. This seems putting the cart before the horse. Indeed, in order
to find out which inferences are truth-preserving, one needs to know the truth con-
ditions of the logical terms. Thus, if ⊃ is the implication of CL or of intuitionistic
logic, then the inference from A to B ⊃ A is truth-preserving; if the implication is
relevant, the inference is not truth-preserving. A (coherent) semantics fixes those
truth conditions and hence fixes which inferences are sound. A (coherent) formal
system also fixes those truth conditions because it determines an inferential seman-
tics. This is usually described in terms of a set of two-valued valuation functions
v. The transition from the formal system to the semantics is obtained by translating
every correct inferential statement A1, . . . ,An ` B to: “for all v, v(A1) = 0 or . . . or
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v(An) = 0 or v(B) = 1”.27 The conclusion of all this is that a logic fixes (its own)
truth-preservation and hence that truth-preservation cannot be used as a criterion for
finding ‘the true logic’.28
Others claim that conceptual analysis provides access to the true meanings of
logical terms. The criticism to this view is all in line with the one in the previous
paragraph. The central question is which concepts are analysed. Intuitionistic dis-
junction is clearly different from classical or relevant disjunction, but both seem
equally coherent. Similarly for implication: the classical, intuitionist, and relevant
concepts are different (and relevant implication has many variants). This is not only
typical for logical terms but also for mathematical ones. Cantor’s and Frege’s set
theories were shown trivial and hence incoherent. Possibly consistent replacements
that have CL as their underlying logic are ZF, NF, and several others. Each of these
clearly concerns (or rather introduces) a different concept of set membership, and
hence a different set concept. A nice example in this realm is Zach Weber’s set the-
ory from [27]. Here the concept of set inclusion is intensional. Where x and y are
sets, x = y iff the condition for being a member of x is equivalent to the condition
for being a member of y, where equivalence is relevant. It follows that there are in-
finitely many sets that, for example, have no member, but are not identical to each
other—and similarly for other sets. This clearly is not in line with the tradition that
locates set theory in the domain of extensionality, and it restricts the possible ap-
plication contexts. Nevertheless, the underlying concept seems quite coherent and
well-analysed.
Returning to the main point, it is possible that, in the end, only one concept of
each kind (one negation, one implication, etc.) would turn out to be coherent—
together they would form ‘the true logic’. This does not seem very likely, however.
That there are different notions of coherence makes it even less likely. The stronger
form of coherence one adopts, the less likely is the warrant for uniqueness. If co-
herent is taken to mean non-trivial, then uniqueness becomes very unlikely. Indeed,
it would mean that at most one logic known today would be non-trivial.29 More-
over, the non-trivial logical concepts would have to be such that they tolerate no
weakening—every weakening of the ‘unique’ logical terms is bound to warrant non-
triviality—see next paragraph. If coherent is meant as stronger than non-trivial, I am
not sure that incoherence is very fatal. Nearly all creative episodes, in empirical and
logico-mathematical sciences alike, were incoherent according to some notions of
coherence.
There is a limit to weakening logical terms. Consider a logical term that has no
meaning at all. So it may be deleted from every string of symbols in which it occurs,
without the meaning of the string being changed. Such a symbol clearly serves no
27 Such an inferential semantics is often ‘ugly’ and sometimes not even recursive. Nicer results are
sometimes obtained by translating the inferential statements to a worlds semantics. In [24], Suszko
has shown that every ‘logic’ has a two-valued semantics; in [22], Routley and Meyer have shown
the same for a two-valued worlds semantics.
28 This holds even for logics phrased in natural language, like Aristotle’s syllogistics. The syllo-
gistics determines to which occurrences of “all”, “some”, etc. it is legitimately applied.
29 A logic L is trivial iff Γ `L A for all Γ and A.
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purpose and does not contribute anything to logic. Phrased differently, empty logic,
viz. the logic L according to which Γ 0L A for all Γ and A, is coherent but does not
explicate or enable any reasoning. Note, however, that another possibility reveals it-
self at this point. We have seen in Sect. 5 that there is an adaptive logic based on zero
logic. Applied to a consistent set of premises, this adaptive logic delivers exactly the
same consequence set as classical logic. Applied to an inconsistent set of premises,
the adaptive logic will interpret the premise set as normally as possible—read this
as: as much as possible in agreement with CL (or with whatever the upper limit
logic is chosen to be). So the lower limit logic assigns no meaning to logical terms,
but the adaptive logic interprets them as much as possible in agreement with CL (or
with whatever the upper limit logic is chosen to be). This means that the meaning
of all logical terms becomes context-dependent, viz. depends on the contents of the
premises.
Incidentally, I consider brain science, truth-preservation and conceptual analysis
as important instruments (of which the first is beyond logicians’ competence). I only
argued that they are not sound means to arrive at ‘the true logic’.
After having attacked means invoked by monologists, I now turn to means that
I would consider conclusive. Actually, I see only one. We (humans) are striving for
obtaining a body of useful knowledge. I write “useful” rather than “complete”, be-
cause completeness seems out of reach anyway. By writing “useful”, I also mean
to exclude unimportant and irrelevant knowledge. Ideally, this body of knowledge
should form a single theory. We are far away from that stage today. Also, we had
better stick to partial and problematic theories rather than opting for a unified but
weaker theory—unification is only a relative merit. Nevertheless, striving for unifi-
cation is important because it reveals problems and sometimes enables us to solve
them. That the adequate body of knowledge is located at the proverbial end of time,
should not prevent us from striving towards it.
Note that the adequacy of a body of knowledge is a function of the world as
well as of our knowledge capacities. The latter are limited. This is why the world
may be so complex that we cannot consistently describe it by the means available to
us, for example denumerable languages. If the inconsistent description is richer and
more precise than any consistent one, then every scientist will obviously opt for the
inconsistent description.
In the ideal body of knowledge, all theories (logical, mathematical, and empir-
ical) should form a coherent structure. What will matter most are obviously the
empirical theories. But these will require mathematical theories and the empirical
theories, together with the mathematical ones, will require logical theories. If this
would reveal that there is a unique true logic, then I shall gladly admit that there is
a true logic.
The reader may have read the previous paragraph as saying that mathematics is
the servant of empirical theories and that logic is the servant of both (remember
that Thomas Aquinas saw philosophy as the servant—“ancilla” he said, which is
a female and not the female of “servus”—of theology). This is not what I meant.
What I did mean, however, is that the world, as knowable by us, who are parts of
the world, is the correct criterion.
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Does this mean that, in the end, I favour monologism? By no means. First, we
are not and never shall be at the proverbial end of time. So we have no idea of what
‘the true logic’ is, if there is one. Next, even at the proverbial end of time, it is still
possible that different theories will require different logics. Even at the proverbial
end of time, some theories may require a different underlying logic than others.
Coherence only supposes that, if a theory T is used to formulate a theory T ′, then T
has a logic that is at least as strong as the underlying logic of T ′.30
The third argument against end-of-time monologism deserves a separate para-
graph. Suppose that a unique logic turns out to be revealed by the adequate body of
knowledge at the end of time. So this is ‘the true logic’. Yet, what use is it to us?
We are not in the ideal end-of-time situation. We have to cope with the present tran-
sitory theories. Handling these may require (defeasible as well as deductive) logics
that are very different from the true logic. This is an understatement. Even physics is
not unified today. There never was as much disagreement on its fundamentals than
in our era—just compare string theories (and their difficulties) with particle physics.
That the end-of-time logic might be adequate for all contemporary theories seems
(put politely) unlikely or (put bluntly) nonsensical.
I have presented two lines of argument. I hope they made the reader doubt, and
hence think—all a philosopher can hope is to make his audience think. Yet, I realize
very well that there is a question that should be answered by me. If there indeed is
this plurality of logics, defining meanings for logical terms, in which way should
we choose which logic applies in which context?
The “we” being ambiguous, let me disambiguate it. Non-logicians make the
choice intuitively in terms of their learned implicit reasoning competence. Whether
this is better or worse is not our concern. If it is worse, we logicians have to teach
them. For us logicians, the task is straightforward but not simple: we have to study
properties of logics to make a justified choice possible. Needless to say, lots of work
still has to be done. I realize this from personal experience. For many years I have
been teaching my freshmen the logic PCR, which is the extension of propositional
CL with a very simple but relevant implication. I think this logic is able to capture
most of natural language reasoning, but I admit that a systematic study is lacking.
By all means, the criterion for choosing between logics is satisficing rather than
optimizing. Given the obviously lacking survey of all possibilities, optimizing is
simply out of reach; satisficing to the contrary is sufficient. This solves many prob-
lems. For example, it relieves us from the impracticable task to find a weighed av-
erage of the different merits of different logics.
In practice, things are rather simple; the motto is: pick a choice and look for
counterarguments. Even if this leads to a choice that is ‘pragmatic’ and provisional,
not much harm will be done provided one keeps track of what happens if things
go wrong. Allow me to give a rather personal example here. I think I found a way
to preserve most of Peano Arithmetic even if Peano Arithmetic is inconsistent—I
referred to this in Sect. 7. The means are to replace Peano Arithmetic by a CL-
equivalent axiom system and to replace CL by a specific inconsistency-adaptive
30 If the underlying logic of T is adaptive—see Sect. 7—then the logic of T ′ should not be stronger
that the adaptive logic’s lower limit.
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logic. From a pragmatic point of view, however, I would advise a mathematician to
go on using CL as underlying logic (and hence not to keep track of the conditions
that the inconsistency-adaptive logic requires). I know this will sound outrageous to
my paraconsistent friends. And yet, I have a good reason for this advice. As long
as no inconsistency is derived from Peano Arithmetic, CL will enable us to de-
rive theorems of Peano Arithmetic that would also be derivable at-a-stage by the
inconsistency-adaptive logic—never mind what this logic precisely is. Once an in-
consistency is (some would like to say “were”) derived from the Peano axioms, there
is an algorithm for transforming every CL-proof into the inconsistency-adaptive
proof and for deciding which lines of the inconsistency-adaptive proof are marked.
So writing CL-proofs is harmless, provided we realize that an inconsistency may
turn up and that we know what we have to do in that case.
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